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The Need for an American Industrial Policy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the years following World War 11, the American econo- 
my enjoyed unparalleled and often unchallenged success. Amer- 
ican companies were leaders in virtually every important man- 
ufacturing and technological industry. In part because of the 
war-time devastation of the Japanese and European economies, 
American corporations dominated a wide range of important 
industries including steel, automobiles, aviation and textiles. In 
addition, America was most often the pioneer in important new 
technologies. The success of American business and industry at 
home and abroad translated into relatively high-paying jobs for 
American workers and one of the highest standards of living in 
the world. 
The economic dominance that America once enjoyed, how- 
ever, has rapidly diminished over the last few decades. Many of 
the industries which American corporations once dominated 
have now become the almost exclusive domain of foreign com- 
petitors. There are now virtually no American producers of 
such consumer electronic goods as televisions, VCRs, 
camcorders, and compact disc players. American industries 
which produce many other important products have been con- 
tinually losing market share and are themselves in danger of 
following the American consumer electronics industry into 
extinction. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently found 
that during the 1980s American companies lost ground to for- 
eign competitors in ten of eleven high technology sectors, in- 
cluding telecommunications equipment, fiber optics, semicon- 
ductors, robotics and supercomputers.' 
Numerous reasons exist for America's inability to compete 
with foreign companies in so many important industries. Part 
of the blame can certainly be laid on the complacency and inef- 
ficiency of American businesses themselves. However, many 
other factors beyond the control of American private businesses 
have also contributed to America's industrial decline. This 
comment focuses on some of these factors and analyzes how 
1. Bentsen Asks for Action; GAO Finds US. High Tech Is Slipping, COMM. 
DAILY, Nov. 20, 1992, at 3. 
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they have threatened and continue to threaten America's in- 
dustrial and economic health. This comment also examines 
several measures which may be taken to strengthen America's 
industrial position. Although much of the burden' of solving 
America's industrial and manufacturing problems must rest 
with American private industry, this paper focuses primarily 
on several government policies, the adoption of which could 
help reverse the trend of manufacturing and industrial decline 
in the United States. 
11. THE NEED FOR A LIMITED INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
A. Industrial Policy Defined 
The notion that government might intervene in the mar- 
ketplace to aid and encourage domestic businesses is often re- 
ferred t o  as "industrial policy." Although the term "industrial 
policy" means different things to different people, for purposes 
of this paper industrial policy is defined as government assis- 
tance to "aid[] industry by helping to develop critical technolo- 
gies and by providing fertile conditions for the industries of 
tomorrow t o  grow.'" 
B. Tensions Between Industrial Policy and 
Free Market Theory 
Despite the decline of many important industries over the 
past few years, the U.S. government has generally been reluc- 
tant to intervene in the market to  assist troubled domestic 
businesses because of its adherence to free trade economic 
theory. Instead, the government has traditionally preferred to 
rely on market forces to  determine which domestic industries 
will expand and which will contract. Free market theorists 
argue that if a nation is losing a particular industry to a for- 
eign competitor, it is because foreign producers have a compar- 
ative advantage in that industry relative to domestic produc- 
e r ~ . ~  Government aid to certain businesses or industries, it is 
2. Steven Greenhouse, The Calls for an Industrial Policy Grow Louder, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 1992, Q 3, at 5. 
3. According to free trade theory, differences in climate, natural resources, 
culture and skills give each country a comparative advantage in the production of 
certain kinds of goods and a relative disadvantage in the production of others. 
Paul R. Krugman, Introduction: New Thinking About Trade Pdicy, in STRATEGIC 
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 7 (Paul R. Krugman ed., 
1986). 
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argued, only subsidizes comparatively inefficient industries 
that cannot succeed by themselves and therefore do not deserve 
to survive. If a domestic producer cannot compete against a for- 
eign competitor, then according to free market economic theory, 
the domestic producer's resources would be better allocated in 
another industry. Accordingly, proponents of free trade theory 
are generally opposed to government intervention in the mar- 
ket to assist domestic businesses. 
C. Why the United States Can No Longer Afford 
to Be Without an Industrial Policy 
Although the government's traditional hands-off relation- 
ship with industry has generally been successful in the past, it 
is clear that this policy does not always work well today. Per- 
haps it would still work if all countries adhered to the same 
practice. However, not all countries intend t o  confine govern- 
ment to a more or less passive role in the marketplace. In fact, 
most of America's major competitors practice some form of 
overt industrial policy. 
Japan, with its Ministry of International Trade and Indus- 
try (MITI), is an excellent example of a nation with an active 
industrial policy. MITI's mission is simply "to advance the well- 
being of the Japanese people through rapid economic g r o ~ t h . " ~  
MITI seeks to accomplish its objective by "changCing1 the indus- 
trial structure by placing it in accordance with world markets 
and competitive forces driven by advancing te~hnology."~ Rath- 
er than ignoring the realities of the market, MITI "shapes and 
alters market forces and accepts the market's judgments of the 
success or failure of [its]  initiative^."^ Japan seeks to channel 
resources t o  strategic industries with proven or great potential 
market value by "encourag[ingI their development through 
grants [and] subsidized in~estment."~ Japan has also employed 
various protectionist measures to help certain fledgling indus- 
tries gain a foothold in the market. Although Japan's industrial 
policies have produced some notable failures, they have also 
helped create successful industries in a number of areas which 
4. WILUAM S. DIETRICH, THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 116 (1991). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 117. 
7. R.C. Longworth, Experts Agree Government Must Help to Save Computer 
Industry, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1992, $ 1, at 12. 
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would likely have never come into existence if left entirely to 
market forces.' 
The Europeans have also employed industrial policies to 
help important industries become more competitive in the 
world market. Europe's Airbus Industrie is one example of how 
foreign industrial policies have hurt American competitors. 
This four-nation aircraft consortiumg "has badly bruised 
McDonnell-Douglas and has become Boeing's main challenger 
thanks to an estimated $20 billion in aid from European 
 government^."'^ 
The loss or decline of certain American industries is thus 
not simply the result of other nations having a natural compar- 
ative advantage. Rather, it is often the result of foreign indus- 
trial policies which have targeted those industries. Dr. Allan 
Bromley, the science advisor to President Bush, warned that 
without government programs to aid American high tech indus- 
tries "we will not only cease to establish the frontiers of knowl- 
edge, but we will be so far behind we won't even be players 
anymore."ll 
D. The Rationale for Limited Government 
Participation in the Market 
Despite the widespread belief in the United States that 
government should not interfere in the market, many econo- 
mists have recognized that some cases exist in which govern- 
ment interference is justified. These include situations where 
promotion of an industry is necessary for purposes of national 
defense, or where an "infant" industry needs protection for a 
few years to enable it to compete against more established 
foreign industries. l2 
Some economists have also recently argued that govern- 
ment participation in the market may be justified to  assist 
industries that produce "external economies" for the nation in 
8. WILLIAM R. NESTER, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL TARGETING: THE NEOMERCAN- 
TILIST PATH TO ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER 22, 38 (1991). 
9. The countries supporting Airbus are France, Germany, Spain and the Unit- 
ed Kingdom. 
10. Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 5. 
11. Peter G. Gosselin, In High Tech, Mergers Outpace US Policy, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 19, 1992, at 1, 14. 
12. See ADAM SM~TH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 429-39 (Edwin Cannan ed., 
Modern Library 1965) (1776); see also RICHARD E .  CAVES & RONALD W. JONES, 
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 26, 228-29 (4th ed. 1985). 
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which they are located. External economies are "benefit[s] from 
some activity that accrue[] to . . . individuals or funs [other] 
than those engaging in the activity."13 In other words, invest- 
ment in some industries "yield[s] high returns to society be- 
cause in addition to their own earnings they provide benefits to 
capital and labor employed elsewhere."14 
From a societal perspective, the market u n d e ~ v e s t s  in 
industries which generate external economies because not all 
the benefits of the investment go to those who make the invest- 
ment. Some industries may provide a high rate of return t o  the 
economy at large because of the high level of external econo- 
mies and yet fail to attract any private investment because the 
return to private investors is so low.15 This seems to be partic- 
ularly true for investments in technologies or industries which 
involve very large investments, high risk, o r  delayed pay- 
offs.16 In such situations, the market may fail to direct invest- 
ments to areas which would yield the highest returns to the 
economy as a whole. 
Two areas of the economy which generate large external 
economies are high technology and manufacturing industries. 
Because investors in these industries do not themselves receive 
all the benefits their investments provide, they are unlikely to 
invest as much in these areas as the good of society would 
suggest. The following sections examine three different types of 
external economies that these industries provide and the dan- 
ger that their loss would cause to the U.S. economy. 
1. Linkages 
One way that an industry may generate external econo- 
mies is through "linkages." The premise of "linkage" is that the 
health of some industries is inextricably linked to the health of 
other industries. The existence of one industry in the domestic 
economy may provide widespread societal benefits through the 
creation of jobs in related industries. Accordingly, the success 
13. Krugman, supra note 3, at 13. 
14. Id. Studies of industrial research and development @&D) investments, for 
example, have found "that, on average, the social rate of return is roughly twice 
the private rate." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE BENEFITS 
AND RISKS OF FEDERAL FUNDING FOR SEMATECH 33 (1987). 
15. See OFFICE OF TECHNOMGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAKING THINGS 
BETTER: COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING 21 (1990) [hereinafter COMPETING IN MAN- 
UFACl'URING]. 
16. Id. at 33. 
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of the related industries is linked to the success of the original 
industry. However, through these same linkages, the loss of 
one domestic industry may have widespread negative effects on 
other industries. 
a.  The link between manufacturing and service 
jobs. Many service jobs are so tightly linked to manufacturing 
that if the manufacturing processes are moved offshore, the 
service jobs will follow in a very short time. The U.S. textile 
industry is a good example of this type of linkage. The U.S. tex- 
tile industry creates 
some 15,000 to 20,000 trucking jobs, specialized in moving 
and warehousing, chemicals, raw materials, yarn, cloths, 
pieces of garments, and even packaging, right up to, but not 
including, the completed garment (at which point imports 
would have the same employment effect). Few of these roles 
would exist without an onshore textilelapparel industry. The 
same is obviously true for those who repair and service the 
machinery used in manufacturing: in almost all cases, they 
have to be located close to the machines that will need servic- 
ing. The same conditions apply to the numerous security 
guards, janitors, bookkeepers, and data processors hired.'' 
Admittedly, many services such as advertising or retailing may 
be unaffected by whether goods are manufactured domestically 
or abroad; however, a great number of service jobs are lost 
when manufacturing processes are moved offshore. 
b. The link between manufacturing industries and "up- 
stream" and "downstream" producers. The loss of domestic 
producers of certain manufactured goods may also have a seri- 
ous impact on domestic manufacturers that are "upstream" and 
"downstream" in the production proces~.'~ If domestic produc- 
ers of certain manufactured goods go out of business and the 
production of these goods is subsequently moved offshore, the 
former domestic suppliers may encounter difficulties in finding 
new buyers or becoming suppliers for the new foreign manufac- 
17. STEPHEN S. COHEN & JOHN ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING MATTERS: ll~ MYTH 
OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 23-24 (1987). 
18. The concept of upstream and downstream linkages simply reflects the idea 
that producers of end products are dependent upon suppliers for critical parts and 
components. For example, computer manufacturers are dependent upon companies 
that make semiconductors. Semiconductor manufacturers are in turn dependent 
upon companies that produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Likewise, 
suppliers are also dependent upon the producers of end products because suppliers 
obviously cannot stay in business if there are no buyers for their products. 
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turer. Given time, new suppliers will likely develop in the same 
region where the end product is being manufactured, and given 
the preference of many companies to  buy from suppliers in 
geographical proximity and from suppliers of the same national 
origin, the American suppliers would be in serious danger of 
being displaced. 
Similarly, if the domestic suppliers of a domestic manufac- 
turer are displaced by foreign suppliers, the domestic manufac- 
turer could be placed at  a disadvantage v i s -h i s  its foreign 
competition because in many industries foreign suppliers of 
component parts are also competitors in the end product. Given 
this situation, once a domestic manufacturer is dependent upon 
foreign suppliers, the foreign suppliers may be tempted to de- 
lay selling the most advanced products to the American manu- 
facturer in order to  give themselves an advantage in the mar- 
ketplace. 
The American supercomputer industry provides a good 
il lustration of th is  problem. "America's remaining 
supercomputer producer, Cray, is dependent on Japanese sup- 
pliers for most of its key components."lg Unfortunately, many 
of these Japanese suppliers also produce supercomputers them- 
selves or are closely aligned with other Japanese companies 
that produce supercomputers. This dependence on Japanese 
suppliers, who are also competitors, has often been exploited by 
these suppliers. For example, "[tlhe management of Cray . . . 
has at times been told that the latest and best of these compo- 
nents are 'not yet available for export' from Japan. They are, 
however, available to Japanese supercomputer makers, and the 
Japanese supercomputers themselves are ready for export."20 
The same type of problem has also been encountered in other 
industries, including the semiconductor industry.21 
(1) The case of the U.S. semiconductor industry- 
how its health depends on the health of "downstream" users of 
semiconductors. The semiconductor industry demonstrates the 
importance of upstream and downstream linkages. A semicon- 
ductor is a silicon chip upon which thousands of electronic 
19. NESTER, supra note 8, at 200. 
20. COMPETING IN ~ A C T U R I N G ,  supm note 15, at 15-16. 
21. Office of Technology Assessment Report "Competing in Manufacturing": Hear- 
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong., 
2d Sess. 124-25 (1990) [hereinafter OTA Report] (statement of Sanford L. Kane, 
former president, U.S. Memories). 
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circuits are fabricated. Semiconductors are "the foundation on 
which computers, office automation products (such as copiers, 
fax machines, and word processors), consumer electronics, ro- 
bots, telecommunications equipment, and many other techno- 
logically advanced industries are The loss of the 
American domestic semiconductor market would be devastating 
to the American economy. The world market for semiconductors 
in 1991 was $66 billion.23 In addition, the world market for 
electronic products, t o  which semiconductors are crucial, ex- 
ceeded $650 billion in 1989.24 The electronics industry is cur- 
rently "the biggest employer in America, providing more jobs 
than the auto, aerospace and steel industries c~mbined.'"~ 
The technology for semiconductors was originally developed 
and refined in the United States, and the United States was 
the undisputed leader in basic semiconductor technology until 
the 1nid-1980s.~~ However, by 1991 the Japanese had captured 
52% of the worldwide market for  semiconductor^.^' At the 
same time, the United States saw its semiconductor market 
share drop from 60% in 1980 to  35% in 1991.28 Four of the top 
five producers of semiconductors are now Japane~e.~'  
Part of the problem for U.S. semiconductor makers is that 
a large portion of the downstream users of semiconductors are 
foreign manufacturers. Because the Japanese are leading pro- 
ducers of products which use large amounts of semiconductors 
(such as consumer electronics and automobiles), it is not sur- 
prising that Japan, rather than the United States, is the 
world's leading buyer of  semiconductor^.^^ 
According to free trade theory, the nationality of the end 
users of semiconductors should not matter to U.S. semiconduc- 
tor producers. Buyers of semiconductors should buy their chips 
from whomever produces the highest quality chip at the lowest 
price regardless of national origin. However, the reality of the 
22. DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26. 
23. See Neil Gross et al., Making Deals-Without Giving Away the Store, Bus. 
WK., June 17, 1991, at 96, 96. 
24. DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26. 
25. David Gergen, America as a Techno-Colony, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
1, 1991, at 88, 88. 
26. DIETRICH, supra note 4, at 26. 
27. Gergen, supra note 25, at 88. 
28. Gross et al., supm note 23, at 96. 
29. Id. 
30. In 1991, Japanese chip buyers purchased an estimated 40% of the world's 
semiconductors compared with an estimated 28% for the United States. Id. at 98. 
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world marketplace is an entirely different matter. Although the 
Japanese market accounts for 40% of worldwide semiconductor 
demand, Japanese firms bought only 12.3% of their semicon- 
ductors from American manufacturers in 1990, up from 8.5% in 
1985.31 That this purchasing pattern is not simply due to poor 
quality or high prices of American semiconductors is supported 
by the fact that American producers have 66% of the American 
automobile market in semiconductors, and more importantly by 
the fact that American producers of semiconductors have 56% 
of the European market-a presumably neutral ground.32 
Another reason that American companies cannot sell semi- 
conductors (and many other products) in Japan is that Japa- 
nese companies, motivated in part by nationalistic sentiment, 
prefer to buy from Japanese suppliers.33 In fact, Japanese 
companies will often buy inferior products from Japanese sup- 
pliers and then work with those suppliers to improve their 
quality.34 Japanese buyers purchase "American goods and 
equipment only when [a] Japanese product is not available or 
until the product can be made in Japan."35 Given this reality, 
an American companfs loss of market share can devastate 
domestic upstream industries which supply components and 
parts to that company.36 
(2) The dependence of U.S. semiconductor producers 
on the health of "upstream" American suppliers of semiconduc- 
tor manufacturing equipment. In a somewhat similar vein, the 
health of the U.S. semiconductor industry also depends upon 
31. Paul Magnusson, The New Chip Pact: This Time If11 Probably Pay Off, 
Bus. WK., June 17, 1991, a t  98, 98. 
32. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, l O l s t  Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990) (testimony of Rep. Doug 
Walgren). 
33. Cf Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Bansportation, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1990) (statement of Peter H. 
Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). Many American companies also admittedly 
prefer to buy equipment from American suppliers when possible. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. a t  35-36 (statement of Joe Parkinson, Chairman & CEO, Micron 
Technology, Inc.). 
36. American producers would have a greater proportion of the world 
semiconductor market open to them if American producers had remained in the 
consumer electronics industry or if American automakers were able to regain some 
of their lost market share. See id. a t  2 1  (statement of John A. Armstrong, Vice 
President for Science and Technology, IBM Corp.). 
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the success of domestic producers of semiconductor manufactur- 
ing equipment. To compete in the semiconductor market, pro- 
ducers must have access to state-of-the-art manufacturing 
equipment. Those producers which are able to employ the most 
efficient, productive and reliable manufacturing equipment will 
obviously have an advantage over those who do not or cannot. 
Like the semiconductor industry itself, the U.S. semicon- 
ductor manufacturing equipment industry enjoyed a substan- 
tial lead over its competitors ten years ago. However, the do- 
mestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has 
suffered such severe losses to Japanese competitors that its 
very survival has been questioned. In 1980, the top five semi- 
conductor manufacturing equipment makers were U.S. compa- 
n i e ~ . ~ ~  By 1990, four of the top five equipment makers were 
Japane~e. '~ Moreover, in 1981 American companies held 73% 
of the international market for manufacturing equipment,3' 
but by 1990 that share had dropped to 38%.40 
This deterioration of the American semiconductor manufac- 
turing equipment industry threatened the health of domestic 
semiconductor producers by making them dependent on foreign 
suppliers for manufacturing equi~ment.~' This would not be a 
serious problem if American semiconductor manufacturers 
could buy the latest and best equipment from foreign suppliers 
on the same terms as their foreign competitors. However, some 
evidence indicates that the Japanese suppliers were intention- 
ally delaying sales of their most advanced equipment to Ameri- 
can f m s  in order to give their Japanese competitors an advan- 
tage in the semiconductor market.42 Given this sort of nation- 
alistic behavior on the part of foreign suppliers, the continued 
health of the domestic manufacturing equipment industry is 
crucial to the viability of the American semiconductor industry. 
37. Proposed Foreign Acquisition of LTV Debated, 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 
904, 905 (June 15, 1992). 
38.. Decline of US. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 71. 
39. Elizabeth Corcoran, US. Semiconductor Toolmakers Regain Ground, SCI. 
AM., July 1992, at 108. 
40. John Markoff, Rethinking the National Chip Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
1992, at Dl, D6. 
41. The American semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry had deterio- 
rated so badly by 1986 that semiconductors could not be produced using all U.S.- 
made manufacturing equipment. Thus, American producers had to buy Japanese 
equipment in order to produce semiconductors. 
42. Semiconductors and t h  Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 54 (state- 
ment of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). 
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2. Infrastructure 
A second way that an industry may generate external 
economies is by contributing to a nation's economic infrastruc- 
ture. Certain industries are essential to a nation's economy 
because they provide "critical or strategic inputs that must be 
available as infrastructure to the rest of the economy.'"43 In- 
dustries such as steel and semiconductors, for example, are 
essential to the existence and growth of many other related 
i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~  
Other industries are critical to the U.S. economic infra- 
structure because of the knowledge and skills they provide to 
American workers. Science-based industries, for example, are 
critical because they "play a role akin to that of universities in 
building and preserving the nation's stock of human capi- 
tal-that is, both scientific and engineering knowledge and the 
ability to expand it."45 This infrastructure is essential to the 
success of small, high technology, entrepreneurial companies 
which are often seen as one of America's greatest economic 
strengths. These "niche" companies do not generally come into 
existence without a supporting foundation. Rather, "most of the 
leading entrepreneurial companies were started by men who 
learned their trade in the laboratories and on the production 
lines of larger ~ompanies . '~~  Furthermore, these companies 
cannot continue to "survive without an infrastructure in which 
they assume specific roles and from which they draw talent, 
expertise, components, equipment and a market. . . . [Tlhey 
must operate in an environment that provides them the sup- 
port they need."" 
The existence of domestic industries in certain areas is also 
critical because "the future growth and technological develop- 
ment of a nation is moulded by the current composition of its 
industries and ac t iv i t ie~ . '~~  The high technology products and 
industries of the future are often developed by applying new 
technologies and improvements to existing products.49 If the 
43. John Zysman, Trade, Technology and National Competition, 7 I m  J .  TECH. 
MGMT. 161, 162 (1992). 
44. N E ~ E R ,  supra note 8, at 16. 
45. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 14, at xviii. 
46. OTA Report, supra note 21, at 123 (statement of Sanford L. Kane, former 
president, U.S. Memories). 
47. Id. 
48. Zysman, supra note 43, at 164. 
49. In addition, innovations that lead to new products or that greatly improve 
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products of today are no longer produced by American compa- 
?nies, the scientific o r  technological breakthroughs which are 
made in the United States may not translate into substantial 
benefits for the U.S. economy. The absence of domestic compa- 
nies in industries which can actually apply new technological 
breakthroughs to commercially viable products causes the tech- 
nology to be sold to foreign companies which can use it.50 Ac- 
cordingly, the additional investment, profits and job creation 
which new technologies make possible may not be realized by 
the United States, but by other countries. 
Government assistance to industry may sometimes be 
necessary because individual American firms are generally not 
concerned about whether their decision to abandon a particular 
industry will hurt the national economic infrastructure. Indi- 
vidual American firms operate under the notion of opportunity 
cost. If they are able to make more money by abandoning an 
industry and concentrating in another, they will do so.51 In 
Japan, by contrast, the opposite approach is taken. "[Tlhe Japa- 
nese feel that t o  abandon a product or market means the po- 
tential loss of other related products and markets and, there- 
fore, the loss of valuable infrastr~cture."~~ 
3. Spillovers 
A third way that an industry may generate external econo- 
mies occurs through the process of "spillover," in which 
"[tlechnological knowledge in one sector or activity. . . pro- 
viders] the basis for innovation in another."53 In other words, 
the lessons learned in developing and making products which 
are considered "technology drivers," such as semiconductors or 
high-definition television (HDTV), are applicable to other in- 
dustries." The consumer electronics business, for example, 
existing products oRen occur not in a scientific laboratory but on the factory floor. 
The factory floor is itself a laboratory where incremental improvements and ad- 
vances are made which may lead to new products. If the factory floor no longer 
exists on domestic soil, it is extremely =cult to develop a domestic capability in 
the next-generation products which use related but more advanced technology. 
50. See Acceleration of US. Technology Utilization and Commercialization: Hear- 
ing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiueness of the House Comm. 
on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1991) (statement of 
Richard J. Elkus, Jr., Chairman, Prometrix Corp.). 
51. Id. at 61-62. 
52. Id. 
53. Zysman, supm note 43, at  165. 
54. OTA Report, supra note 21, at  125 (statement of Sanford L. Kane, former 
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has become an increasingly important source of technological 
spillovers because the technologies used in these products are 
converging with those used in computers and other business 
products.55 America's virtual absence from the consumer elec- 
tronics industry has put American firms at  a disadvantage in 
the development of new products, especially in the area of com- 
puters and business products.56 This is because foreign firms 
are able to use the technology and experience gained from pro- 
ducing consumer electronics products to  gain an advantage in 
these other related industries. 
For example, firms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan adapted the 
superior CRTs [cathode ray tubes1 they developed for tele- 
vision to computers, and took a large share of that CRT mar- 
ke t .  . . . Canon used its expertise in optics, developed in pro- 
ducing consumer cameras, to help in gaining its present emi- 
nence in photocopiers. Perhaps most important, Japanese 
firms producing consumer products such as VCRs gained 
experience with automated production lines which they are 
now applying to the manufacture of computers.57 
Although the exact level of spillovers generated by an in- 
dustry is impossible to predict, certain technologies hold such 
great promise and such potential widespread application that 
their development merits government support. Some of the 
underlying technologies for HDTV, such as flat panel liquid 
crystal displays, are possible candidates for such support.58 
Innovations and developments in HDTV technology are likely 
to have application to computers, telecommunications, medical 
imaging, education, and p~blishing.~' In addition, HDTV is 
likely t o  "push advances in manufacturing processes" which 
may be applicable to other areas of the electronics industry.60 
Knowledge of manufacturing process technology for HDTV 
could help U.S. companies become more competitive by helping 
them to improve manufacturing processes for other products. 
president, US. Memories). 
55. COMPETING IN ~~ANUFACTURING, supm note 15, at 84. 
56. See id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at 85-89. 
59. See id. at 80-85. 
60. Id. at 83. 
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For many years the United States has had a limited and 
unspoken industrial policy. However, in order for American 
companies to  be internationally competitive, the US. govern- 
ment needs to take a more active role t o  promote the health 
and growth of American industries. The goal of a US. industri- 
al policy should be to enhance the economic prosperity of its 
citizens by helping to create and to maintain high value-added 
jobs for American workers. Because high value-added jobs are 
found in the manufacturing and high technology industries, one 
important objective of an American industrial policy should be 
to adopt policies that encourage the growth and enhance the 
competitiveness of these industries. The following sections 
examine three strategies that the US. government could em- 
ploy to achieve these objectives. 
A. Government-Industry Consortia 
One strategy frequently employed by other nations as a 
part of their overall industrial policy is an effort to bring gov- 
ernment and industry together to collaborate on important 
projects. This effort often takes the form of government- 
sponsored cooperation between competitors in the same indus- 
try in "pre-competitive research and development." This cooper- 
ation allows competing companies to  avoid duplicating research 
in pre-competitive areas and helps them to stretch their re- 
search and development budgets further than otherwise possi- 
ble. Such cooperation also enables companies in an important 
industry to engage in expensive and risky, but potentially prof- 
itable, research projects that no individual company could af- 
ford to undertake alone. 
This type of government-sponsored consortium has the 
potential to help American companies compete in a number of 
industries. Consortia may be particularly helpful in high tech 
industries where technology advances rapidly and where Amer- 
ican companies already spend four to  five times as much on 
research and development (R&D) as other manufacturing com- 
panies. The United States already has a prototype program, 
known as the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Con- 
sortium, or Sematech, after which other programs could, be 
modeled. 
7651 AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 779 
1. Sematech as an example of a successful government- 
sponsored consortium 
Sematech is a manufacturing technology consortium con- 
sisting of the federal government and eleven companies which 
produce semiconductors or semiconductor manufacturing equip- 
menL6* At the time of Sematech's creation in 1987, both the 
semiconductor and the semiconductor manufacturing equip- 
ment industries were in serious trouble due to intense Japa- 
nese c~mpeti t ion.~~ Critical American suppliers of semiconduc- 
tor manufacturing equipment had fallen far behind the Japa- 
nese and were dropping out of the industry.63 American pro- 
ducers of semiconductors had become dependent upon Japanese 
suppliers for their manufacturing equipment, "and they feared 
that they would not have reliable access to the latest and most 
efficient models-jeopardizing the whole chip industry's ability 
to compete.'*4 
Administered under the guidance of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Sematech was created with 
the goal of returning technological and manufacturing superior- 
ity in the semiconductor industry back to the United States. 
Sematech's approach was to reduce the R&D burden on mem- 
ber companies by pooling their resources and those of the feder- 
al government to conduct joint research in pre-competitive 
techn~logies.~~ The consortium focuses on "areas that offer 
industry-wide benefit without providing new product technolo- 
gy with which members can directly compete."66 The federal 
government contributes $100 million annually to the consor- 
tium, an amount that is matched by the eleven member compa- 
n i e ~ . ~ '  
61. The consortium began in 1987 with 14 participants from private industry. 
Three of these original members (Micron Technology Corp., Harris Semicondudor, 
and LSI Logic) have since withdrawn from the consortium because of a lack of 
common goals. 
62. Between 1983 and 1989 the industry lost more than $4 billion and 25,000 
jobs. Thomas McCarmll, Chips Ahoy!, TIME, Nov. 23, 1992, a t  62, 62. 
63. James Flanigan, US. Semiconductor Industry Rebounds from Hard Rnocks, 
L.A. Trms, Od. 4, 1992, at Dl, D5. 
64. When Znclustrial Policy Works, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1992, at A18. 
65. Flanigan, supra note 63, at D5. 
66. Peter Burrows, Consortia: Are They Getting Better?, ELECTRONIC BUS., May 
18, 1992, at  47, 49. 
67. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 56 (state- 
ment of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). The leveraging effect of 
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Because of the perilously weak position of the manufactur- 
ing equipment industry and the dependence of US. semicon- 
ductor producers on foreign suppliers of manufacturing equip- 
ment, Sematech's first objective was to restore the health of the 
manufacturing equipment industry. Sematech sought t o  "re- 
build a U.S. capability a t  every step of the semiconductor pro- 
duction [pro~essl ."~~ In pursuit of this goal, Sematech has en- 
tered into more than fdty partnerships with forty-five Ameri- 
can companies designed to improve the technology and reliabil- 
ity of U.S. manufacturing equipment." Sematech has also 
worked to improve the manufacturing equipment industry ''by 
pinpointing areas of technical discontinuities and engineering 
problems, rather than developing specific products or manufac- 
turing processes."70 Consequently, the biggest benefits t o  the 
industry have come not through great leaps in technology, but 
rather through incremental improvements in equipment and 
manufacturing  technique^.^' 
Some quantifiable evidence suggests that these efforts are 
helping to make US.  equipment manufacturers more efficient. 
For example, as a result of Sematech's efforts, 
ATEQ cut a year off development of a laser mask writer. LAM 
Research cut development costs 33% on an ECR machine for 
laying down dielectric. Working with six Sematech members, 
GCA Corp. improved the mean-time-between-failure of a new 
wafer stepper from 150 hours to more than 800 hours, mak- 
ing it competitive with Japan's best."' 
In addition, "NCR Corp. said new technology was introduced 
into its manufacturing process nine to 12 months sooner as a 
result of Sematech's programs."73 Sematech will also save the 
industry millions of dollars through its development of "a chem- 
the federal spending is even greater because when Sematech works with suppliers 
of important manufacturing equipment, the supplier puts in three dollars for every 
dollar that Sematech invests in the project. Id. at 65-66. 
68. Longworth, supra note 7, at 12. 
69. Peter Burrows, Bill Spencer Struggles to Reform Sematech, ELECTRONIC 
Bus., May 18, 1992, at 57, 60. 
70. Sematech Consortium Head Says U.S. Must Solve Its Own Problems, Stop 
Blaming Japan, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, World 
Library, BNAITD File. 
71. See Burrows, supra note 66, at 49-50. 
72. Burrows, supra note 69, at 60. 
73. Daniel Southerland, Sematech's Critical Juncture: Hailed as Success, Chip 
Consortium Faces Budget Cuts, WASH. PO=, Aug. 28, 1992, at B1, B2. 
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ical reclamation program, which reprocesses sulfuric acid" and 
results in "minimal disposal requirements and reduced environ- 
mental hazards."74 
Although less tangible, one of Sematech's most important 
accomplishments is instilling a greater spirit of cooperation 
between makers of manufacturing equipment and the compa- 
nies who actually use such equipment. As one analyst has 
observed, "the once-warlike relations between chip makers and 
equipment makers are [now] far more c~operative."~~ A GAO 
report noted that "some Sematech initiatives emulate Japanese 
practices by working with key suppliers to develop the next 
generation of e q ~ i p m e n t . " ~ ~  As a result, "[tlhe big 
semiconductor companies are now developing long-term rela- 
tionships with their suppliers instead of regarding them as 
potential  competitor^."^^ 
Similarly, Sematech has helped foster greater cooperation 
between competitors in the pre-competitive stage. Sematech 
has "developed lower-cost methods of chip manufacturing by 
creating computer models that simulate semiconductor assem- 
bly lines. And it has devised uniform testing guidelines for 
equipment to replace the hodgepodge of standards set by differ- 
ent chipmakers."78 In  addition, Sematech member Intel points 
out that they now share all of their "internal methodologies for 
characterizing, qualifymg, and debugging [their] eq~iprnent . "~~ 
During its first five years, Sematech has been instrumental 
in helping reverse the fortunes of the US. semiconductor in- 
dustry. For the first time in almost a decade, U.S. makers of 
semiconductor manufacturing equipment actually saw their 
world market share increase in 1991 to 41%, up from 38% in 
1990.80 "This increase represented jobs generated in the 
United States, or not lost, greater than the government invest- 
ment in the [Sematech] e~periment."~' 
The improvement appears to be due largely to the efforts of 
74. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 62 (state- 
ment of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Sematech). 
Burrows, supra note 69, at 62. 
Southerland, supm note 73, at B2. 
When Industrial Policy Works, supra note 64, at A18. 
McCarroll, supra note 62, at 63. 
Burrows, supra note 69, at 62. 
Markoff, supra note 40, at D6. 
William J. Spencer, Technologies Need Nurturing, N.Y. ~ M E S ,  July 10, 
at Dl,  D4. 
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Sematech. Some buyers of manufacturing equipment who had 
previously relied on foreign suppliers have noted that the im- 
provements in the American equipment fostered by Sematech 
enabled them to buy more American equipment than they had 
originally planned. Intel, for example, noted that it bought 50% 
of its new equipment for a fabrication facility from U.S. produc- 
ers rather than the 30% it had expected to Likewise, 
Motorola bought over 80% of its equipment for a new fabrica- 
tion facility from American sources instead of the 25% for 
which it had planned.83 Robert W. Galvin, the chairman of 
Sematech and the former chairman of Motorola, stated that "he 
believed that if Sematech had not been created five years ago, 
some American semiconductor producers that are now thriving 
would be out of business today."84 
2. The role of government in sponsoring consortia 
Although some experiments with government-industry 
consortia are now being c0nducted,8~ these efforts have been 
limited and only begin to tap the vast potential benefits which 
may be realized from this type of cooperation. In the electronics 
industry, for example, only 60 of over 20,000 companies are full 
82. Burrows, supra note 66, at 48. 
83. Id. 
84. Southerland, supra note 73, at B2. 
85. In addition to Sematech, a limited number of other consortia currently ex- 
ist. One such consortium is the Advanced Battery Consortium, consisting of the Big 
Three automakers (Ford, Chrysler and General Motors) and the federal govern- 
ment. The consortium's purpose is to develop advanced electric-car batteries for the 
future. See Donald Woutat, Big 3 U S .  Auto Firms Team Up on Rey Projects, L.A. 
TIMES, June 9, 1992, at Al, A10. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has also recently 
proposed a new government-industry consortium to develop flat-panel displays, 
which are on everybody's list of critical technologies, and for which there is cur- 
rently a $5 billion market. Proposed U S .  Venture Would IZy to Combat Japanese 
Lead in Flat Panel Display Market, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Nov. 23, 
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File. The flat-panel display 
consortium would be modeled &r Sematech and would be directed by members 
from private industry. This proposed consortium would be an important experiment 
because it would be 'designed to get a new industry going rather than to shore up 
an existing industry. Id. The f i s t  three-year phase of the proposed project would 
"generate knowledge about display manufacturing and accelerate development of 
new technologies." Don Clark, Pentagon Plans New Effort on Flat-Panel Displays, 
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1992, at B1, B12. The second phase might include financing 
by DARPA to encourage U.S. companies to begin full-scale manufacturing. Id. 
DARPA's current plan proposes spending $12 million of federal funds on the pro- 
ject in the first year. Proposed U S .  Venture Would Try to Combat Japanese Lead 
in Flat Panel Display Market, supra. 
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participants in some type of government-industry consor- 
tium.86 Additional consortia in existing industries and in 
promising new industries could potentially yield s i ~ i c a n t  
benefits to U.S. industry and the U.S. economy. 
Although private consortia may often succeed without 
government assistance, some potentially successful consortia 
may never even come into existence without government par- 
ticipation. Competitors within an industry often distrust each 
other and are frequently reluctant to cooperate with one anoth- 
er.87 This distrustful attitude often impedes the formation of 
an effective research consortium even when the consortium 
promises to yield substantial benefits.88 Government partici- 
pation may be of great importance in such situations because 
in addition to providing financial incentives, government in- 
volvement lends credibility to the venture, lessens suspicion, 
and helps increase the commitment of the individual mem- 
b e r ~ . ~ ~  Government involvement may also be important be- 
cause of its "convening power," o r  in other words, "its ability to 
organize and sponsor or sanction the activity.*' 
B. Manufacturing Extension Centers 
The creation of manufacturing extension centers through- 
out the country is another program which could prove highly 
beneficial to the health of U.S. manufacturing industries. Mod- 
eled after the highly successful agricultural extension centers, 
the purpose of these centers would be to assist U.S. manufac- 
turers, particularly small and medium-size manufacturers, in 
applying the latest manufacturing and production technology. 
A need for such centers certainly exists because manufacturing 
capability is an area in which the United States trails its for- 
eign competitors. As one observer notes, "[clompared with their 
Japanese competitors, many of America's 357,000 manufactur- 
ing firms are stuck in a time warp today. . . . [A] combination 
of inertia and high capital costs has kept many from adopting 
improvements.*l 
86. Burrows, supra note 66, at 47. 
87. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U .S .  CONGRESS, USING R&D CONSOR- 
TIA FOR COMMERCIAL INNOVATION: SEMATECH, X-RAY LITHOGRAPHY, AND HIGH-RESO- 
LUTION SYSTEMS 40 (1990). 
88. See id. 
89. See COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING, supra note 15, at 207, 209. 
90. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 87, at 12. 
91. Susan Dentzer, Sharpening Our High-Tech Edge, U.S.  NEWS & WORLD 
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Small firms in particular find it difficult to keep up with 
advancing manufacturing technology. These f m s  ''offen lack 
the capital, the tax incentives, the access to information, the 
management strategies, and the training" necessary to effec- 
tively apply advanced manufacturing techn~logy.~~ Small 
firms also often lack the expertise necessary to determine 
"what equipment best fits their needs, [and] how to use it effi- 
~ i e n t l y . ' ~ ~  
Failure of small and medium-size manufacturers to keep 
up with technological advances has nationwide economic impli- 
cations. The failure to adopt advanced manufacturing tech- 
niques and equipment creates competitive problems for the 
small firms as well as for the larger manufacturers who rely on 
them for  component^.^^ The lack of modern manufacturing 
expertise also forces American companies with innovative ideas 
to go overseas to manufacture their products.95 Unfortunately, 
this translates into lost jobs and lower wages for American 
workers. 
One reason American companies have lagged behind their 
Japanese counterparts in manufacturing is that the United 
States devotes most of its research resources to basic scientific 
research as opposed to process te~hnology.~~ "According to one 
study, Japanese companies invest roughly 70% of their R&D in 
process technology, whereas comparable US.  companies invest 
REP., Dec. 16, 1991, at 71, 73. 
92. Critical Technologies: Machine Tools, Robotics, and Manufacturing: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on 
Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1991) (statement of Leo 
Reddy, President, National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing). 
93. COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING, supra note 15, at  158. 
94. See id. at 25. 
95. For example, even though Japanese labor rates are similar to U.S. rates, 
LSI Logic decided to move its semiconductor wafer fabrication plant from the Unit- 
ed States to Japan because factory productivity rates were two to four times high- 
er in Japan than in the United States. Given this differential, the company felt 
that it had no choice but to relocate its plant. Louise Kehoe, Cost Constraints 
Prompt a Continental Shift: LSrs Decision to Close Its G e m n  Plant Shows the 
Problems Facing High-Tech Manufacturing in Europe, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at  
13. 
96. Process technology generally refers to the way that products are manufac- 
tured and brought to market. For example, improvements in the way that products 
are manufactured may reduce the number of defects found in a manufactured 
product or reduce the cost and time required to design and manufacture a new 
product and bring it to market. Basic scientific research, on the other hand, focus- 
es on developing new technologies which can lead to the creation of entirely new 
products. 
7651 AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 785 
about the same proportion in product R&D.'*7 As a result, al- 
though US.  companies are usually the leaders in developing 
the technologies which lead t o  new products, the Japanese 
profit from the developments because of their superiority in 
manufacturing and process technologies. The key to keeping a 
manufacturing company successful in the global market today 
depends less on major scientific breakthroughs and more on 
"[clost-sensitive design, new process technologies, [and] manu- 
facturing systems engi~~eering."~~ Manufacturing extension 
centers could help U.S. manufacturers improve their production 
processes and hence the quality and reliability of their prod- 
ucts. Significant gains could be achieved by helping "companies 
to improve their ability to  use new process technologies such as 
computer-aided design, computer-controlled machine tools, or 
electronic data inter~hange."~~ 
Although there are consultants in the private sector which 
specialize in helping manufacturers apply new technologies, the 
availability of private sector assistance does not appear to have 
been effective in helping small manufacturers. Small and 
medium-size manufacturers hesitate to use private consultants 
because they "don't trust their ability to find a consultant who 
will tailor his advice to what the manufacturer needs rather 
than what the consultant has t o  sell."loO Some small firms al- 
so cite difficulties in obtaining competent help from private 
consulting f m s ,  perhaps because " '[tlhe engineering service 
consultants usually send out the new guys to small firms. 7 ,7101 
On the other hand, because state government extension servic- 
es "are not trying to sell the companies anything or collect big 
fees," small manufacturers are more likely to trust their objec- 
tivity and impartiality.lo2 
The federal government and some state governments have 
already made some limited efforts to promote the diffusion of 
manufacturing technology. The federal government recently 
established a technology extension program which provides for 
six Manufacturing Technology Centers.lo3 Twenty-three . 
97. Lewis M. Branscomb, Does America Need a Technology Policy?, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 24, 25. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 30. 
100. COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING, supm note 15, at 174. 
01. Id. at 180 (quoting Gary Brooks, President, Brooks Manufacturing). 
102. Id. at 179. 
103. See id. at 26. 
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states "are spending a total of $50 million a year supporting 27 
technology extension  center^."'^ Many state industrial exten- 
sion centers have already demonstrated the value that such 
programs can have for the nation's manufacturing industries. 
"Georgia Institute of Technology, for example, has helped al- 
most 3,000 companies over the past five years solve manufac- 
turing-process problems."lo5 In Pennsylvania, a team of ex- 
perts from a state-sponsored industrial extension center helped 
Scheirer Machine Co. to "reorganize its shop floor and raise 
productivity by about 15% in just six months. The center lent 
Scheirer $150,000 a t  5% interest to buy a computerized lathe. 
And the company will get ongoing assistance to upgrade its 
technology further."lo6 The services provided by the extension 
centers are in such demand that some of the centers do not 
"advertise for fear of attracting too much business."lo7 
The existing state and federal programs are, however, still 
very limited and underfunded. All of the programs combined 
probably reach less than two percent of all small manufactur- 
ing This effort is dwarfed by the Japanese, who 
spend over $470 million supporting 185 technology extension 
centers.lo9 
The Office of Trade and Technology Assessment estimates 
that the cost to run industrial extension programs in all states 
would be about $480 mi1li0n.l'~ However, the net cost to the 
federal government for such a nationwide industrial extension 
program is likely to be significantly less than the actual cost 
because the government can expect to receive a return on its 
investment. Improving the productivity and profitability of U.S. 
manufacturers should help retain and create high-wage jobs in 
the United States and thereby increase tax revenues.ll' This 
104. Christopher Farrell et al., Industrial Policy, BUS. WK., Apr. 6, 1992, at 70, 
73. 
105. Id. at 73. 
106. Michael Schroeder, Small Business Has a Friend in Pennsylvania, Bus. 
WK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 75, 75. 
107. COMPETING IN MANUFACTURING, supm note 15, at 183. 
108. Id. at 18. 
109. Id. The current amount spent for industrial extension services is also insig- 
nificant when compared with the Agricultural Extension Service, which receives 
$1.2 billion (31% federal) in funding and has 4,650 scientific and technical staff. Id. 
at 55. An increase in funding for industrial extension services would appear justi- 
fied considering that "agriculture contributes 2 percent to the gross national prod- 
uct, and manufacturing 19 percent." Id. 
110. Farrell et al., supra note 104, at 73. 
111. This appears to be the case with agricultural extension programs. 
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appears to  be the motivation for the states which have already 
set up industrial extension programs. Their goal is to preserve 
and develop "stable, high-paying factory jobs,"112 which in 
turn strengthens their tax base. 
C. Lower the Cost of Capital and Improve Tax Incentives 
During the last decade, U.S. competitiveness was hindered 
by the high cost of capital for US. companies compared to the 
cost for their Japanese and many of their European counter- 
p a r t ~ . ~ ' ~  Since the decline of the Japanese stock market, the 
cost of capital for Japanese companies has approached that of 
U.S. companies. However, U.S. companies still face a competi- 
tive disadvantage in their ability to finance investment in 
equipment and R&D due to the low US.  savings rate and unfa- 
vorable tax laws. Thus, one final element of an effective Amer- 
ican industrial policy would be to enact laws which would in- 
crease the US.  savings pool and encourage investment in high 
technology and high value-added industries. 
1. The low U.S. savings rate 
For the past several years, the US. savings rate has been 
well below that of many of America's economic  competitor^.^'^ 
Theoretically, a low domestic savings rate should not necessari- 
ly be detrimental to U.S. companies. Assuming that world 
capital markets are completely open, U.S. companies should be 
able to borrow from foreign lenders and investors at the same 
rate as their foreign competitors. In theory then, U.S. compa- 
nies should be at  no disadvantage with reference to the avail- 
Two studies have found high rates of return on investments in agricultur- 
al research, extension, and farmers' schooling. One study estimated inter- 
nal rates of return (value of agricultural producthesearch and extension 
expenditures) of 27 percent on such public investments in the State of 
Virginia . . . . The other study found a social internal rate of return to 
public crop research of 62 percent, and 15 percent to farmers' schooling. 
COMPETING M MANUFACTURING, supra note 15, at 55 11.46 (citations omitted). 
112. Schroeder, supra note 106, at 75. 
113. James Flanigan, In Adversity, U.S. Finds New Strength, LA. TIMES, May 
13, 1992, at Dl, D3. The cost of capital is defined as "the total cost of financing a 
company through borrowing and issuing stock." Id. 
114. The U.S. savings rate, which has recently averaged about 5.5% of GNP, 
looks particularly bad when compared with the Japanese savings rate, which has 
averaged around 18%. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, 
at  43 (statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech). 
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ability and cost of capital. This theory, however, is seriously 
flawed.l15 It assumes that the source or national origin of the 
capital is irrelevant. Unfortunately, American competitiveness 
is affected by the source of capital, especially in high technolo- 
gy industries. 
In order to modernize their manufacturing facilities o r  to 
invest in a promising R&D project, companies are required to 
raise large amounts of capital. Because U.S. capital is lacking, 
companies are often forced to look to  Japan for investment. In 
1988, for example, twenty percent of all US. semiconductor 
equipment and materials suppliers who work with Sematech 
had to get their expansion financing from Japanese sourc- 
es.l16 Japan clearly has the capital to invest, as a result of its 
huge trade surplus (a cumulative $400 billion with the United 
States over the last decade).l17 However, in return for desper- 
ately needed Japanese capital, companies are at  times forced to 
make critical concessions to competitors or potential competi- 
tors. Often, a company must agree to share its technology or 
grant a license in return for access t o  Japanese capital.l18 As 
a result, Japan is able to transfer many high value-added jobs 
to  the Japanese economy.11g 
Japanese companies have also used their pools of excess 
capital to buy American high technology firms. The large num- 
ber of acquisitions of American high technology companies by 
Japanese f m s  is alarming, to say the least. The Economic 
Strategy Institute in Washington reported that between 1988 
and 1991, Japanese companies accounted for 87 of 133 foreign 
purchases of all or part of US. computer companies, 
115. The cost of capital for American firms might be higher than for their for- 
eign competitors even if they had equal access to capital from foreign lenders. Cost 
of capital is influenced not only by "the cost of funds-interest rates or the cost of 
equity''-but also by other factors such as "corporate tax rates, the economic depre- 
ciation of the investment and its tax treatment, and other fiscal incentives for 
investment." COMPETING IN MANUFAWRING, supra note 15, at  94. Thus, even if 
the capital markets of all countries were open, and there is some evidence that 
they are not, the cost of capital is likely to vary in different countries as a result 
of differing tax and fiscal policies. 
116. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at  43 (state- 
ment of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech). 
117. Longworth, supra note 7, at 12. 
118. See Jack Robertson, Yields on Joint Ventures, ELECTRONIC NEWS, July 27, 
1992, at  11, 11. 
119. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 43 (state- 
ment of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech). 
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26 of 48 foreign investments in U.S. electronics firms, 48 of 53 
investments in semiconductor companies, 27 of 37 invest- 
ments in companies making semiconductor equipment, 30 of 
59 telecommunications investments and 36 of 48 investments 
in companies making advanced materials . . . . CIln at least 
half these deals, the Japanese bought a majority owner- 
ship.lZ0 
In contrast, it is extremely difficult for an American firm to 
acquire a Japanese firm. "In 1990, there were 801 mergers and 
acquisitions in Japan; only 10 involved foreign firms buying 
Japanese f m s .  In all 10 cases, it was a friendly acquisition in 
a low tech business."121 The problem is not the amount of 
Japanese investment, but rather the fact that the Japanese are 
targeting specific high technology industries, and that the 
technology flow in these industries is one-way from the United 
States to Japan.lZ2 The danger is that America's technological 
advantage in many industries is being rapidly eroded as Japa- 
nese competitors cheaply acquire American technology in ex- 
change for capital. The loss of technological advantage makes it 
more difficult for other American firms to compete, and this in 
turn results in lost market share, lost manufacturing base, lost 
jobs and a higher trade deficit. This situation creates a vicious 
circle. A large trade surplus with the United States gives the 
Japanese a iarge pool of excess capital with which to acquire 
U.S. companies and technology. This acquired technology in 
turn helps the Japanese companies gain market share over 
U.S. companies, thereby generating an even larger trade sur- 
plus. 123 
To alleviate this problem, the U.S. savings rate must be 
increased, thereby increasing the available pool of U.S. capital. 
This objective may be accomplished in a number of ways.124 A 
broad-based tax on consumption would raise the savings rate 
but would likely be so unpopular as to be politically infeasible. 
Another possible solution is to give tax breaks for savings and 
120. R.C. Longworth, Japanese Find Variety of Ways to Buy U.S. Ideas, CHI. 
TRIB., May 19, 1992, 5 1, at 1, 15. 
121. Id. 
122. See Robertson, supra note 118, at 11. 
123. See Decline of U S .  Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 38 
(statement of Robert N. Noyce, President, Sematech). 
124. A lengthy discussion of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this com- 
ment. 
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investment. One often suggested method is to reduce or com- 
pletely eliminate the capital gains tax for long-term invest- 
ments of five to ten years or more. Most of America's competi- 
tors have very low or no capital gains tax1* To level the 
playing field with these competitors, the U.S. capital gains tax 
on long-term investments should be significantly lowered. An- 
other possibility is t o  expand existing savings programs such as 
Individual Retirement Accounts by increasing the amount of 
income that may be deducted and deferred, and by expanding 
the class of individuals who are allowed to participate. 
2. Unfavorable tax policies 
American companies are also faced with a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to their Japanese and European 
competitors due to unfavorable laws relating to depreciation 
schedules and credits for investment. The pace of innovation 
and change is so great in high tech industries that firms have 
to invest huge amounts of money just to keep up with the lat- 
est technology. The cost of constructing high tech manufactur- 
ing facilities is staggering and is expected to increase. The 
Japanese are able to depreciate their high technology equip- 
ment investments in three years as opposed t o  five years for 
American companies.126 This makes investment much 
cheaper and therefore more attractive to Japanese compa- 
n i e ~ . l ~ ~  
Changing the depreciation schedules to allow for a faster 
write-off of high tech investments would more accurately reflect 
the reality of the market because technology changes so quickly 
that most high tech investments are actually obsolete in three 
years.128 Allowing American companies t o  depreciate their in- 
125. Decline of U.S. Semiconductor Infrastructure, supra note 32, at 13 (state- 
ment of Michael P. Skarzynski, Assistant Secretary for Trade Development, Depart- 
ment of Commerce). 
126. See Jack Robertson, Equipment Tar Break-Picking Up the Pieces, ELEC- 
TRONIC NEWS, Apr. 13, 1992, at 10, 10. 
127. For example, one industry executive noted that " '[ilf Intel invests $1 billion 
in new plant and equipment, it will pay $270 million more in taxes over five years 
than a Japanese company will . . . . This is because the Japanese can write this 
investment off over two or three years, while our write-off is five years.'" 
Longworth, supra note 7, at 12 (quoting Michael Maibach, government affairs man- 
ager, Silicon Valley Co.). 
128. See Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at  6 
(statement of John A. Armstrong, Vice President for Science and Technology, IBM 
Corp.). 
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vestments in high technology equipment more rapidly would 
encourage such investment and would allow American com- 
panies to compete more effectively with foreign rivals. 
The government could also encourage investment in high 
technology industries by restructuring the current R&D tax 
credit. The government should fnst make the R&D tax credit 
permanent. Because Congress never made the credit perma- 
nent, it must vote to reenact the tax credit every year. The 
uncertainty regarding the future availability of the credit may 
actually thwart a company's long-term investment plans.lm 
Furthermore, to encourage investment in improving manufac- 
turing processes and techniques, the credit should be extended 
to process and engineering R&D in addition to product R&D. 
The R&D credit should also be made available to "first 
dollar" investments. In the current system, the credit only 
applies to incremental increases in R&D spending over the 
average spending during the base years 1984 to 1988.13' This 
system fails to provide an adequate incentive for si@icant 
R&D spending because the years 1984 to 1988 were "among 
the most prosperous in U.S. manufacturing to date."131 As 
one observer of the semiconductor industry has noted, the prob- 
lem "is not one of an increment in R&D funding, the problem is 
one of keeping the R&D funding even at  a constant real 
rate . . . . [Tlhe R&D tax credit only on the increment is not of 
much use to the industry."132 
IV. CONCLUSION 
American industry has not performed particularly well 
over the last ten to twenty years. America has seen the decline 
of many important industries and is currently witnessing the 
decline and destruction of several others. The U.S. manufactur- 
ing industry and infrastructure are vital to the health of the 
overall American economy, including the service and technology 
industries. Instead of watching passively as American manufac- 
turing and support jobs are moved abroad, the federal govern- 
129. Dentzer, supra note 91, at 75. 
130. Manufacturers Urge 'Aggressive' Steps on Innovation, Call for R&D Credit, 
ITC, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Nov. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, DREXEC File. 
131. Id. 
132. Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry, supra note 33, at 6 (statement 
of John A. Armstrong, Vice President for Science and Technology, IBM Corp.). 
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ment should take an active role in creating the conditions in 
which American industry can flourish. Although the govern- 
ment need not pick winners and losers in the market, the gov- 
ernment should assume the role of a partner with business 
with the common goal of promoting economic prosperity. By 
participating in research consortia in important industries, 
establishing a network of manufacturing extension centers, and 
providing incentives for greater savings and investment, the 
government can help American industry gain a competitive 
edge in the world market. 
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